In practical crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, posted pricing is widely used due to its simplicity, where a task requester publishes a pricing rule a priori, on which workers decide whether to accept and perform the task or not, and are often paid according to the quality of their effort. One of the key ingredients of a good posted pricing lies in how to recruit more high-quality workers with less budget, for which the following two schemes are considered: (i) personalized pricing by profiling users in terms of their quality and cost, and (ii) additional bonus payment offered for more qualified task completion. Despite their potential benefits in crowdsourced pricing, it has been under-explored how much gain each or both of personalization and bonus payment actually provides to the requester. In this paper, we study four possible combinations of posted pricing made by pricing with/without personalization and bonus. We aim at analytically quantifying when and how much such two ideas contribute to the requester's utility. To this end, we first derive the optimal personalized and common pricing schemes and analyze their computational tractability. Next, we quantify the gap in the utility between with and without bonus payment in both pricing schemes. We analytically prove that the impact of bonus is negligible in personalized pricing, whereas crucial in common pricing. Finally, we study the notion of Price of Agnosticity (PoA) that quantifies the utility gap between personalized and common pricing policies, where we show that PoA is not significant under many practical conditions. This implies that a complex personalized pricing with more privacy concerns can be replaced by a simple common pricing with bonus, if designed well. We validate our analytical findings through extensive simulations and real experiments done in Amazon Mechanical Turk, and provide additional implications that are useful in designing a pricing policy in crowdsourcing.
Introduction

Motivation
Crowdsourcing system is a popular tool to solve problems which involve huge dataset but can be decomposed into simple tasks, where the tasks are electronically distributed to numerous workers who are willing to perform the tasks at low cost. It is useful, in particular, when the tasks, e.g., image classifications, are easy for human but hard for computer. People have paid much attentions to the following two directions in crowdsourcing: (i) post-processing dataset and (ii) worker quality control . In (i), once a task is given to workers, since payment is typically low and tasks are tedious, error is common even among those who are willing. This is further complicated by abundant spammers trying to make easy money with little effort. To handle this, the requester adds redundancy by assigning the same task to multiple workers, and from these redundant answer data set, some nice statistical inference techniques such as majority voting or belief propagation are applied to infer the correct answer to the task, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4] . However, there should be unavoidable limitations in terms of guaranteeing a target precision when workers inputs are highly erroneous [5, 6] . In (ii), it would be highly beneficial to recruit as many high-quality workers as possible, which is possible by incentivizing workers to produce qualified output, see e.g., [7, 8] . In crowdsourcing, workers get paid as a reward of effort on submitting answers. Many experiments reveal that not only the quantity of users' labels [9, 10] , but also the quality of their labels significantly improve [11, 12, 13] , if the payment for incentivization is properly designed. There exist many researches on efficient mechanism design for pricing in crowdsourcing, ranging from sealed bid auction to posted pricing (see more details in Section 1.3).
Out of many pricing mechanisms, practical crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk popularly use posted pricing due to its simplicity and convenience to workers, where a task requester publishes a pricing rule a priori, based on which each worker decides on the task acceptance and its completion. As in other pricing mechanisms, in posted pricing, recruiting and discouraging high-quality and low-quality workers, respectively, is the key, for which the following two ideas are natural: (i) personalized pricing by offering individual price to each worker based on her quality and cost and (ii) giving additional bonus (in addition to base payment just for participation) to workers with more qualified task completion. However, it has been largely under-explored how much gain each or both of personalization and bonus actually provides to the task requester.
Main Contribution
Personalized pricing (PP) that individually treats workers based on their cost and quality profiles obviously seems superior to the pricing without personalization, referred to as common pricing (CP) in this paper, which offers a uniform pricing to the entire workers. However, PP is obviously more complex and more privacy-vulnerable, especially for the tasks with a large number of workers. A simple option of giving bonus for more qualified workers in both PP and CP should provide more power of controlling workers' behaviors, so as to help in increasing the requester's utility. In this paper, we essentially consider four possible combinations of posted pricing made by personalized/common pricing and those with/without bonus payment, from which we quantify when and how much personalization and bonus payment contribute to the requester's utility. We summarize our main contributions in what follows:
• Optimal personalized pricing. In Section 3, we first derive the optimal pricing schemes (or their structures) in PP and CP. In PP, we prove that computing an optimal scheme is equivalent to solving the generalized 0-1 knapsack problem (GKP), which is known to be NP-hard. Using their equivalence, it is possible to inherit the approximation algorithms in GKP, which were developed under some special conditions of the objective utility function in literature, and we apply them to develop an approximation algorithm in designing an efficient scheme in PP. However, our investigation of the utility functions from popular crowdsourcing tasks in practice motivates us to study the unexplored conditions in literature: subadditivity and Schur-convexity. Under these conditions, we prove that a greedy-type algorithm achieves 1/2-factor approximation of the optimal PP, which can also be applied to GKP with a slight modification.
• Optimal common pricing. In Section 4, we characterize the structure of the optimal way of pricing in CP. To this end, we assume a certain relation between workers' cost and quality, motivated by our empirical study in Section 7.2. This relation is divided into three regimes: effort-unresponsive, effortsubresponsive, and effort-responsive, depending on how workers' quality grows with increasing effort. For all three regimes, we prove that the optimal pricing schemes are highly structured, which is crucial to develop three polynomial-time algorithms, being in sharp contrast to PP. The time complexities are at most O(B(n)n log n), where B(n) is the pricing budget that may scale with the number of workers n.
• Power of bonus and PoA (Price of Agnosticity). Using the optimal pricing results of PP and CP in Sections 3 and 4, in Section 5, we first prove that bonus is a marginal device in the optimal PP, whereas it is of significant importance in the optimal CP. This is intuitive because personalization has sufficient power to control workers' behavior in PP, but bonus may be the only way to differentiate high and low-quality workers in CP. Next, we draw an interesting result that CP with bonus is comparable to PP by quantifying the notion of Price-of-Agnosticity (PoA) that is the utility gap between the optimal PP and CP schemes. This is somewhat surprising because a simple way of unified (base, bonus) payments is practically enough to achieve a comparable performance to personalized pricing. This enables task requesters to ensure that a simple pricing such as common pricing, if properly designed, is able to provide a large amount utility.
• Implications from simulation and real experiment. To validate our analytical findings, we provide extensive simulation results, and perform various experiments on a real-world platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk. Especially, from our real experiment reveals the significant importance of bonus in common pricing, where without bonus, workers do not take the task even with excessive base payment offered, Misc. [30, 31, 32, 33] whereas with only small bonus, workers invest a large amount of effort of performing given tasks. This has a good match with our theoretical result on the impact of bonus. Furthermore, we derive other useful implications, in particular, on efficient pricing policies that deliver quick and qualified responses from workers.
Related Work
Posted Pricing. Deriving the optimal pricing becomes the problem of solving the knapsack optimization problem for which the following prior work exists. The authors in [24, 25] suggest approximation algorithms in the bayesian setting, assuming (a) the complete knowledge of the probability distribution of each worker's cost and quality, and (b) submodularity or additivity of the utility function. The authors in [27] consider the problem which is dual to [24] , wherein with a given utility constraint the objective is to minimize the cost. The authors in [23] study the posted pricing in a large market setting where the cost of a single worker is very small compared to the budget. In [34] , it is revealed that the online cloud resource problem can be expressed nicely by a posted pricing mechanism, showing its equivalence to a variant of an online knapsack problem and proposing an optimal posted pricing mechanism in terms of the competitive ratio.
Other types of on-line setting for posted pricing have been studied, where the requester gradually adapts to heterogeneous worker qualities or task difficulties. In [35] , the authors consider online worker arrivals with the objective of maximizing the number of solved tasks. The authors in [26, 28] study this problem in the context of posted pricing for online procurement auction. They again assume online arrivals of heterogeneous workers and formulate a problem in the multi-armed bandit framework, providing an analysis of UCB (Upper Confidence Bound) algorithm. The authors in [29] study a similar problem, but for homogeneous workers and heterogeneous tasks.
Auction-based pricing. All-pay auction has been studied as a good pricing [16, 15, 14, 22, 36] in crowdsourcing, where all workers obligatorily pay their bids (i.e., efforts) regardless of the allocated items, and then get paid from the task requester based on their efforts. They propose the algorithms with a certain approximation ratio of various bidding strategies, for different forms of revenue functions, especially in crowdsourcing contests. Another mechanism is the sealed-bid auction, where each worker first submits her bid for a set of tasks and the amount of charge she claims for performing such a set of tasks. Since the real world crowdsourcing system is not operated in such a one-shot manner, they fill such a gap using the concept of repetition of sealed-bid auctions. The requester tries to appropriately profile the task difficulties and worker qualities in an adaptive manner to maximize their revenue under the budget constraint, e.g., [22, 21, 20, 18] . To avoid the computational intractability of an optimal winning bid allocation for maximizing the utility, they suggest a greedy-style algorithm mechanism, and prove its truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. The authors in [19] consider the hardness in the verification of submitted quality and propose a cost-effective mechanism with guaranteed symmetric Nash Equilibrium.
Bonus. There exists an array of prior work which studies bonus in various pricing scenarios. The authors in [37, 38] conduct a massive real-world experiment to measure the performance of various pricing mechanisms with bonus. In [30, 31] , the problem of designing a crowdsourcing platform has been studied, assuming that workers try to align their output, and the authors analyze an equilibrium of the system regarding the proposed incentivizing algorithms. The authors in [32, 33] redefine the concept of incentive-compatibility, and propose an axiomatic approach to find an incentive-compatible mechanism.
iii
Model
We consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n workers, where n is the number of workers who are eligible to perform a target task given a certain time deadline. Each worker i ∈ N is associated with a profile (r i , c i ) if she can produce the output of (expected) quality r i ∈ [0, 1] at cost c i ≥ 0. In the worker i's profile, quality r i corresponds to the expected individual contribution to the task and cost c i corresponds to the opportunity cost of the time to perform the task. The task is associated with a utility, which corresponds to the satisfaction given to the task requester and is a function of the expected contributions {r i x i } i∈N from workers, where we denote x i = 1 if worker i participate the task and x i = 0 otherwise. More formally, we associate the task with the utility function U (r • x) for some U : [0, 1] n → R, where r := {r i } i∈N , x := {x i } i∈N and • is the element-wise product of two sequences of the same length, i.e., r • x = {r i x i } i∈N . We assume U is symmetric 1 and non-decreasing 2 . This assumption means that worker's contribution is equally and always welcome. Example: Typo correction task. Consider a typo correction task with M hidden typos, where a natural utility function is the number of expected typos corrected by at least one worker. Let s i be the probability of worker i of correcting a single typo independently. If the requester has some fixed number m ≤ M and regards the quality r i as the probability of correcting at least m typos, the mapping between s i and r i is such that
. Thus, we have the following utility function:
where
is the probability that worker i fails to find and correct a single typo. Then, we can easily see that the above utility function is symmetric and non-decreasing, with increasing b Pricing policy with bonus. We consider a posted pricing scheme to recruit workers, where a fixed pricing policy is posted before workers perform the task, while the pricing policy may depend on a given worker profile {(r i , c i )} i∈N . We particularly consider pricing policies with bonus, where bonus payment is additionally paid to workers who accomplish good-quality output. To formalize, we denote it by π := {(p i , q i )} i∈N , where each worker i is paid p i ≥ 0 dollars as a base payment for participation, and at most q i ≥ 0 dollars as a bonus payment proportional to the quality of her contribution. Hence, quality r i can be interpreted as the normalized expectation of bonus payment. We note that the pricing policy includes the worker qualification and thus the definition of quality or individual contribution, which often play a crucial role in designing a pricing policy.
Worker behavior. Under the belief that the requester has a mechanism to perfectly evaluate each worker's contribution 3 , and each worker i knows her own profile (r i , c i ) with her payoff (p i + q i r i − c i ) × x i . We assume rational workers each of whom strategically maximizes her individual expected payoff, for given pricing policy. More formally, for given π, the strategic decision of worker i is denoted by φ i (p i , q i ): that the choice of quality indeed changes each worker's decision. For example, recall the typo correction example, where each worker i has the probability to correct a typo at s i , while quality r i depends on the definition of qualified worker, i.e., r i is a function of the minimum number m of typo corrections required for bonus q i . Hence, even for the same value of q i and the same set of workers, the set of participating workers can change depending on the definition of quality.
Personalized pricing and common pricing. We classify post pricing policies into two groups: personalized pricing (PP) policies, and common pricing (CP) policies, depending on whether policy provides personalized pricing for each worker, or not. Mathematically, since a CP policy {(p i , q i )} i∈N decides every worker's payment using a common policy, it can be simplified into a single pair (p, q) of base and bonus payments where p i = p and q i = q for each worker i ∈ N . Hence, the set of all CP policies is a subset of all PP policies. Despite PP policy's more controllability on workers' behavior and thus more expected utility, it seems useful to CP policy, since PP policy is often discouraged in practice, e.g., Amazon Mechanical-Turk [39] . Also, PP policy requires more sophisticated and detailed information on worker profile, leading to privacy concerns, whereas the CP policy needs only a summarizing property of the entire worker profiles rather than individual ones.
Problem Formulation
Our goal is to find an optimal pricing policy π which maximizes the task utility given worker profile {(r i , c i )} i∈N and budget constraint B ≥ 0, i.e., the sum of expected payments to workers does not exceed B. We first define the optimal PP policy as a solution of optimal personalized pricing problem (OPP) in the following:
subject to
where (3b) corresponds to the assumption on the rational workers, and (3c) refers to the budget constraint . We note that the control variables of (3) is the personalized pricing policy {(p i , q i )} i∈N .
In CP, the pricing policy is forced to be indistinguishable for all workers, while each worker i can react differently since the expected worker utility still depends on individual profile (r i , c i ). In this scenario, the control variables {(p i , q i )} i∈N in (3a) are simplified into a single pair of base and bonus payments (p, q), and the following optimization problem is considered:
As mentioned earlier, note that the optimal PP policy outperforms the optimal CP one since the distribution of the CP policy is agnostic on workers, while that of the PP policy discriminates workers. However, OCP requires only partial information on worker profile, e.g., how many workers have some specific profile, whereas OPP needs to know the individual profile (r i , c i ) for each worker.
In both OPP and OCP, we have the following tensions: If the requester sets high base and low bonus, it may fail to recruit high-quality users and utilize only low-cost users. If bonus is set too high with low base, it should spend a huge amount of bonus on high quality users, so that the total number of recruited users shrinks. Thus, it is necessary to strike a good balance between base and bonus payments while satisfying the budget constraint to maximize the offered utility. This paper aims at addressing the following three main questions: Q1. Optimal pricing policy. What are the optimal base and bonus payments for both PP and CP policies? Are they easy to compute, and if hard, what are the approximate algorithms and how are their qualities? Q2. Power of bonus. We exploit the concept of bonus in posted pricing model. Does it actually improve the utility? How beneficial is the bonus payment in PP and CP policy? Q3. Price of Agnosticity. How much utility does the requester lose by pricing workers in a unified manner rather than by pricing them in a personalized manner?
This implies that the bonus in PP policy is not mandatory since personalization in pricing is enough to control workers' behavior without bonus payments. However, finding such optimal PP policy is computationally intractable for a general utility function. Indeed, it is well-known that even a special case of GKP, e.g., GKP with an additive utility, is NP-hard. Hence, recalling the equivalence between OPP and GKP in Theorem 3.1, OPP is also NP-hard. To make the problem tractable, we will consider utility functions U that have some structures. We first review the following notion of majorization which compares two sequences of real numbers:
n , let a † denote the sequence with the same components, but sorted in descending order. Given a, b ∈ R n , we say that a weakly majorizes b and denote a ≻ w b if
If a ≻ w b and additionally
, we say that a majorizes b, and denote a ≻ b. We now consider utility function U : [0, 1] n → R with either of the following conditions:
Note that additivity in C2 implies subaddivity and Schur-convexity in C1, i.e., C1 is a more general condition than C2. Considering C1 and C2 is motivated by practical tasks such as typo correction task or labeling task. Subadditivity can be interpreted as diminishing returns of workers' effort, which is often observed in practice since workers produce duplicated or redundant answers. Schur-convexity captures that a group of high-quality and low-quality workers perform no worse than a group of average-quality workers even though those groups have the same average worker quality, since the objective is often dominated by outputs from a few experts. Indeed, the utility function in (1) for the typo correction task with m = 1 satisfies C1. In Appendix, we provide a proof of subadditivity and Schur-convexity of (1) for m = 1. Moreover, changing the utility function to the expected number of typos corrected by workers leads to an additive utility function. We remark that even the additive utility has a large set of applications such as survey or sensing.
Algorithm 1 ModifiedGreedy
, where η i := ri ci , i.e., sort in the descending order of bang-per-buck η i .
x j(k) = 1 5: k ← k + 1 6: end while 7: Find m = arg max i∈N U (r • e (i) ), where e (i) is the sequence such that e (i),j = 1 if j = i and e (i),j = 0 otherwise.
Approximation Algorithm for OPP
We recall that under C1 or C2, OPP is still NP-hard, since GKP with C2 corresponds to the classical 0-1 knapsack problem, known to be NP-hard. However, it is reported that a greedy algorithm works well for the 0-1 knapsack problem with additive utility functions [40] . Inspired by this, we propose ModifiedGreedy in Algorithm 1 for OPP. In ModifiedGreedy, we use the notion of bang-per-buck η i := r i /c i which denotes the ratio of quality to cost. All the workers are aligned by their values of bang-per-buck, and the top k workers or only one worker with the highest quality is recruited. ModifiedGreedy has polynomial complexity with respect to n and the following guarantee under C1: The proof is presented in Section 6.2. We note that under the stronger condition C2, the utility function becomes separable. The separability in C2 provides stronger approximation guarantee using fully polynomialtime approximation scheme (FPTAS) with approximation ratio of 1 − ǫ for the knapsack problem, see, e.g., [41, 42] . However, under C1, the objective function is not separable. For the 0-1 knapsack problem, such a non-separable objective makes the performance guarantee more difficult, and thus a somewhat restrictive class of objective functions is considered in prior work, e.g., exponential functions [43] , quadratic functions [44] , and submodular function with approximation ratio 1 − 1/e [45, 46] . Theorem 3.3 provides a constantfactor approximation for more general conditions of subadditivity and Schur-convexity for the 0-1 knapsack problem. This is of broad interest to the applications which can be formulated by the 0-1 knapsack problem.
Optimal Common Pricing
In this section, we now study the optimal common pricing problem (OCP) in (4) , that has much less freedom in choosing the price, yet used in many practical crowdsourcing systems. Despite the dimensional reduction of OCP, compared to OPP, we still find that solving OCP has a fundamental hardness due to the non-convex utility function and non-convex constraint even for an additive utility function. In order to handle such challenge in finding a global optimum in OCP, we introduce an assumption of one-to-one correspondence of worker's quality and cost. In detail, we assume that a quality of any worker follows a monotone increasing mapping f : [0, 1] → R, where r i = f (c i ). Moreover, we assume that f is twice-differentiable on its domain. This assumption is motivated by the empirical studies which reveal that according to the type of the tasks, induced profile distribution has quite specific form [38] . Following the notion of task types used in [38] , we introduce the following regimes of workers' profile: Definition 4.1 We divide the class of function f into the three regimes:
Technically, the size of f ′ (x) and
decides whether the bang-per-buck value,
is increasing with respect to c or not, since ∂
In this context, the provided regimes can be interpreted using the behavior of bang-per-buck of workers. In effort-unresponsive regime, bang-per-buck tends to decrease as cost increases. This naturally describes a scenario that there exists no significant improvement in worker's quality even when cost increases. This regime is considered to be highly practical, assuming the real world behavior of workers against tasks which is quite trivial for many people, as will be verified in our experiments (see Section 7.2). Some instances of task which reside in this regime include audio transcription task and handwriting recognition task [38] . In contrary, bang-per-buck could possibly be decreasing when c is low, but it will eventually be increasing when c becomes high. This oppositely describe the scenario of large improvement in worker's quality with respect to increasing cost, e.g., a task where the quality of workers largely differs with respect to invested effort. Hence for effort-responsive regime, it is expected that high-quality workers need to be recruited. Proofreading task and spot-the-difference task can be the examples for such a regime [38] . In effort-subresponsive regime, bang-per-buck value possibly starts to increase as cost increases until it achieves some point, but it finally increases with cost. Following the similar logic of the previous regime, it is expected that recruiting workers within a medium range of quality would lead to a good pricing strategy in this regime.
Structure of Optimal Common Pricing
In OCP, our goal is to find the optimal CP policy, denoted by a sinlge pair (p ⋆ , q ⋆ ) of base and bonus payments. To this end, we first define two notions of pricing structure in CP, which facilitates the characterization of the optimal pricing policy, as described shortly. Definition 4.2 Let j(i) denote the index of worker who has i-th highest quality, i.e., r j(1) ≥ r j(2) ≥ ... ≥ r j(n) .
5 Consider a CP policy π = (p, q). The policy π is said to be [ℓ, u]-picking when φ j(i) (p, q) = 1 if ℓ ≤ i ≤ u, and φ j(i) (p, q) = 0 otherwise, i.e., only workers with quality between ℓ-th highest to u-th highest values take the task. Conversely, the policy π is said to be [ℓ, u]-blocking when φ j(i) (p, q) = 0 if ℓ ≤ i ≤ u, and φ j(i) (p, q) = 1 otherwise, i.e., only workers with quality between ℓ-th highest to u-th highest values decline the task.
With the notions of [ℓ, u]-picking and [ℓ, u]-blocking in Definition 4.2, Theorem 4.3 states that under each cost-quality regime, any pricing policy induces some special structure in recruiting workers, which further sheds light on the structure of the optimal pricing policy for three regimes. We present the proof in Section 6.3. Theorem 4.3 provides characterization of pricing policies in CP for three different cost-quality regimes. This characterization not provide an analytical closed-form, yet giving us a useful clue on how CP policy should behave, conditioned on the relation between quality and cost. Since such structural regularity holds for any pricing policy, an optimal pricing policy π ⋆ = (p ⋆ , q ⋆ ) naturally inherits it. This result enables us to develop algorithms for computing π ⋆ in polynomial time in Section 4.2. Particularly in the effort-unresponsive regime, we are able to obtain a more detailed characterization of the optimal CP policy, which also allows us to develop a much simpler algorithm to solve OCP, as we will describe shortly.
Algorithms for Optimal Common Price
We now present three algorithms, each of which outputs the optimal CP for three different regimes, for which the key ingredients are the optimal structures obtained as in Theorem 4.3. In this subsection, we focus on providing the key ideas and the main results of three algorithms, and the full algorithms descriptions are provided in Appendix for the readers' convenience. We name three algorithms for effort-subresponsive, effort-unresponsive, and effort-responsive regimes as CP-SUBRES, CP-UNRES, and CP-RES. Effort-subresponsive regimes. As stated in Theorem 4.3, this regime requires the optimal pricing that is [ℓ, u]-picking. Using this structural property, CP-SUBRES operated with the following skeleton:
Skeleton of CP-SUBRES
The algorithm operates in such a way that we iterate the upper worker index u = 1, . . . , n, and for each upper index u, we find that the lower worker index ℓ ⋆ (u) such that the pricing inducing [ℓ ⋆ (u), u]-picking with satisfying the budget constraint (Steps (i)-(iii)). Then, we produce the output pricing as the optimal one that maximizes the utility over all per-u best pricing schemes with budget feasibility in (iv).
All steps seem straightforward except for (ii). Note that for a fixed upper worker index u, the utility is monotone-increasing with respect to the lower worker index l = u, u − 1, . . . , 1, i.e. as l decreases. Thus, assuming that we can easily find the pricing π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-picking and check whether π(ℓ, u) satisfies the budget constraint or not, it is possible for us to utilize an efficient search method, e.g., the binary search algorithm for fast searching. We now discuss how to compute π(ℓ, u) and check whether it is budget-feasible or not. A natural way of handling this is that we aim at finding (p, q), such that for the worker index i ∈ [ℓ, u], q × r i + p ≥ c i , and for other index i / ∈ [ℓ, u], q × r i + p < c i , and the budget constraint
Since many well-known algorithms to solve an LP basically assumed that there is no strict inequality constraint, we firstly need to deal with the strict inequality constraints. In here, we propose a method to handle such difficulties using a special structural property coming from our assumed regime i.e. the function f in r i = f (c i ) is concave, and the fact that our problem is only to find a feasible point. This will be elaborated in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Effort-unresponsive regime. As stated in Theorem 4.3, the optimal pricing in effort-unresponsive regime is [ℓ, n]-picking, which is a special case of [ℓ, u]-picking, where u = n. Thus, CP-SUBRES can be applied to this regime without any modification. However, the fact that u = n gives rise to an additional property that no base payment is necessary, and only bonus payment is enough for the optimal pricing (see the proof of Theorem 4.4). This additional property significantly simplifies the search process of CP-SUBRES so that it suffices to find ℓ in [ℓ, n]-picking. Technically, the linear programming step in (ii) of CP-SUBRES is not required. We describe CP-UNRES in Appendix, and Theorem 4.4 presents the running time complexity of CP-UNRES.
Effort-responsive regime. This regime requires the optimal pricing to be [ℓ, u]-blocking, which can be interpreted as a "dual" of effort-subresponsive regime. However, the search of ℓ and u in this regime is highly similar to that of CP-SUBRES, as explained in what follows. While fixing upper index u, we search the index ℓ ⋆ (u) over ℓ ∈ {1, 2, ..., u} that provides the maximum utility over the pricing schemes π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-blocking and is budget-feasible. Then, we linearly probe the index u ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and find the optimal scheme among the upper index u. The full algorithm CP-RES in this regime is described in Appendix.
Theorem 4.4 states the correctness of three algorithms and their running time complexity. Note that the given budget B = B(n) may scale with the number of workers n, for which we include it in the running time analysis in the theorem.
Theorem 4.4
With given budget B = B(n), CP-SUBRES and CP-RES output their optimal CP pricing schemes in O B(n)n log n times, respectively, and CP-UNRES outputs the optimal CP scheme in O(n) time.
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In this section, we provide theoretical comparison between personalized and common pricing policies in terms of power of bonus (Q2) and price of agnosticity (Q3).
Power of Bonus
The impact of bonus payment may differ for both personalized and common pricing policies. A natural intuition is that such a power of bonus is weaker in personalized pricing than in common one. This is because in common pricing, the bonus payment may be the only device to filter out and compensate for high-quality workers' effort, whereas personalized pricing has full capability to manipulate individual user's behavior by matching individual payment to targeted user's cost. Indeed, recalling (6) in Theorem 3.1, we can always find an optimal PP policy without bonus, where each worker i is offered only c i as base payment if she is targeted, i.e., x ⋆ i = 1, and is offered nothing if she is not targeted, i.e., x ⋆ i = 0. This implies that the bonus payment does not help in increasing the optimal utility of personalized pricing.
We now study impact of bonus in common pricing policies. Our intuition is that there exists a certain amount of gain from the bonus payment, since without it, there is almost no way to incentivize high-quality workers, and to prevent inefficient payment to low-quality workers or cherry pickers. We quantify this intuition by providing an example, where the ratio of optimal utility of common pricing policy without bonus to that without bonus can be arbitrarily small. 
The constants γ and δ capture the inefficiency of using common pricing instead of personalized pricing in terms of utility and budget, respectively. We note that PoA is (1, 1) when there exists a common pricing that achieves the utility of the optimal personalized pricing with the same budget. Hence, PoA (γ, δ) close to (1, 1) implies that it is enough to use a common pricing policy, which is much simpler than a personalized one, if it is properly designed. In the following theorem, we quantify PoA under canonical assumptions.
Theorem 5.3 Consider a worker profile (r, c), where worker index is sorted in descending order of bangper-buck η i = ri ci , i.e., η 1 ≥ ... ≥ η n , and budget B ≥ 0. Assume utility function u satisfying that for all i ∈ N such that c i ≤ B,
where e (i) is the sequence such that e (i),i = 1 and e (i),j = 0 for all j = i. Then, the followings hold:
where we define k B := max{k :
, and
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is provided in Section 6.6. We now briefly provide the interpretation of Theorem 5.3, followed by more in-depth description in the subsequent paragraphs. This theorem basically implies that under a mild condition as in (10), the optimal common policy (which can be computed in polynomial time) provides at least a half of the optimal utility of personalized policy as in (a), or more as in (b) with a small increase of allocated budget. Noting that the optimal personalized pricing is computationally intractable for a large number of workers n, the actual utility due to common pricing would be closer to what a practical personalized pricing is able to provide. This shows that a simple bonus payment that are uniformly applied, not personalized, to all workers turns out to have a large power in recruiting high-quality workers and discourage low-quality ones. We also highlight that utility of common pricing without this bonus payment can be arbitrarily worse than that with bonus (see Theorem 5.1), which manifests that the role of bonus payment in common pricing is crucial. Note that the condition in (10) means that the optimal utility of personalized pricing is simply twice larger than the utility from a pricing which recruits only a single user, which is readily satisfied when the number of workers in the system is reasonably large. In other words, we can find a sufficiently large n, such that (10) is met. We now investigate how δ kB behaves with worker profiles {(r i , c i )} i∈N . First, from the hypothesis that workers are sorted by bang-per-buck η i = r i /c i and the construction of the worker index k B , we can easily check that that (i) δ kB ≥ 1 and (ii) γ kB ≤ 1/2. The value of δ kB depends on how r i depends on c i , i.e, the form of f (·) in r i = f (c i ). To exemplify, we consider two types of f (·), one is concave (thus, effort-unresponsive) and one is convex (thus, effort-responsive) as in Figure 1a . We uniformly generate 100 workers respectively. Figure 1b shows how δ kB changes for different values of k for those two types of f (·) functions. We observe that when f (·) is concave, δ kB k is maintained to be small. to check that π ⋆ satisfies the constraints in (3b) and (3c). Suppose the policy π ⋆ is not a solution of OPP. Then there exists a solution
, where
This contradicts to the optimality of x ⋆ , and completes the proof of the second part, and thus Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Without loss of generality, suppose that the workers are aligned in the descending order of bang-per-buck η i = ri ci , i.e., η 1 ≥ ... ≥ η n . Let x ⋆ be the output of ModifiedGreedy. Then, we will obtain a lower bound of U (r • x ⋆ ), for which consider the linear relaxation of GKP (GKP-relax) in the following:
(i) Find j, k ∈ N and ε > 0 such that j < k, 0 ≤ a j < 1, 0 < a k ≤ 1, and ε = min 1 − a j ,
, and let j, k, ε be those in the greedy iteration for z. In the greedy iteration, we have
It is straightforward to check that the sequence of feasible instances z, z ′ = σ(z), σ(σ(z)), ... from iteration of σ(·) converges to z ⋆ after n-th iteration. Thus, it suffices to show the following:
since the above implies
, which contradicts to the hypothesis on the optimality of z, and thus completes the proof of Lemma 6.1. To show (14), we compare r • z and r • z ′ .
which implies that comparing r • z to r • z ′ , the amount of increment in j-th element is larger than that of decrement in k-th element. Hence, r • z ′ weakly majorizes r • z, i.e., r • z ≺ w r • z ′ . Using this, the assumptions on U (·), i.e., non-decreasing and Schur-convex, directly implies (14) This completes the proof of Lemma 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
For ease of presentation, we first define some notations. Let R i = R i (c i ) be the expected payment of worker i if she accepts the task, i. 
Since
for c ∈ R in effort-unresponsive regime, (15) c for c ∈ R. We compute the sign of the second order derivative of (15) as follows:
Hence, h(c i ) is convex in effort-responsive regime, and concave in effort-subresponsive regime. Note the basic property that any level set of a convex function is a convex set. Hence, in effort-responsive regime, the level set {c i | h(c i ) ≤ 1} is a convex set. Recall that that
, which means that for each worker i with h(c i ) ≤ 1 does not take the task. This implies that any pricing policy (p, q) in effort-responsive regime is [ℓ, u]-blocking. In effort-subresponsive regime, where h(c i ) is concave, we take the similar argument to that in effort-responsive regime, it follows that any pricing policy (p, q) is [ℓ, u]-picking. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. xiii
Proof of Theorem 4.4
Effort-unresponsive regime. We first prove that CP-UNRES finds an optimal CP policy for effortunresponsive regime in O(n) time. Note that CP-UNRES outputs a CP policy which is optimal among the one whose base payment equals to 0. For notational simplicity, without loss of generality, the workers are aligned in the descending order of cost. Consider a CP policy (p ′ , q ′ ) where p ′ = 0, and suppose that it is [ℓ, n]-picking. Then, we have qr i + p ≥ c i for i = ℓ, ℓ + 1, . . . , n, and the total expected payment to workers given by:
where (18) denotes the total payment to workers from ℓ to n of policy (0,
). Hence, for any [ℓ, n]-picking pricing policy (p ′ , q ′ ) in effort-unresponsive regime, a pricing policy (0,
) achieves the same amount of utility, while spends less budget. Using this fact, CP-UNRES (presented in Appendix) is designed to compute just the bonus payment which produces the largest utility, where it is easy to check the complexity of CP-UNRES needs O(n) time. This completes the proof. Effort-subresponsive regime. We next prove that CP-SUBRES find an optimal CP policy for effortsubresponsive regime in O(B(n)n log n) time, where CP-SUBRES is presented in Appendix. We observe that CP-SUBRES solves a linear programming A ℓ,u x ≤ b ℓ,u over (ℓ, u) where u iterates from n to 1 while we perform the binary search for optimal ℓ ⋆ (u). Hence, let the running time of linear programming be LP (n), and the entire running time can be expressed as O(LP (n) · n log n).
We now prove that for given ℓ and u, finding π(ℓ, u) that induces [ℓ, u]-picking and is budget-feasible or deciding its non-existence takes O(B(n)) time. Recall that any pricing policy in effort-subresponsive regime is [ℓ, u]-picking. Thus, the following inequalities are sufficient for a CP policy (p, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking:
which can be simply expressed as A ℓ,u x ≤ b ℓ,u by loosening the strict inequality, where the matrices A ℓ,u and b ℓ,u is defined in Appendix. Then, we can check if there exists a budget-feasible policy in O(B = B(n)) time [47] . Now suppose that the output of A ℓ,u x ≤ b ℓ,u satisfies the equality on either of the (19) or (22) . Assume that the equality holds for (19) on output (p, q) of CP-SUBRES. We show that there exists a positive real value ǫ in which (p − ǫ, q) is also feasible to A ℓ,u x ≤ b ℓ,u , and does not satisfy the equality on (19) . Since decrementing (p, q) to (p − ǫ, q) can possibly harm (20) or (21), it is sufficient to show that there exists such ǫ such that (20) and (21) are met. Suppose that the following holds for CP policy (p, q):
This means that c ℓ−1 − qr ℓ−1 = c ℓ − qr ℓ , which can be expressed as the following:
In effort-subresponsive regime, ri ci is monotone increasing in c i . Thus, in order for the equality to hold in (25), we must have that c ℓ−1 = c ℓ . Then, however, r ℓ−1 = r ℓ also holds, where it becomes impossible for any CP xiv pricing (p, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking. Similarly, it can be shown that (19) and (21) cannot simultaneously satisfy the equality. Note that the equality in (22) cannot be satisfied. Elaborating these facts together, there exists a positive real value ǫ > 0 which makes CP policy (p − ǫ, q) to be [ℓ, u]-picking and budget-feasible. Recall that the LP A ℓ,u x ≤ b ℓ,u can be solved in O(B(n)) [47] , which completes the proof for effort-subresponsive regime. Effort-responsive regime. Due to high similar to effort-subresponsive regime, we omit this proof for brevity.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let n(p, q) = |{i ∈ N : φ i (p, q) = 1}| be the number of workers who accept the task given a CP policy (p, q). Let n ℓ , n m , and n h be the numbers of workers with the profiles (ε, c), (1, 2c), and (2, 2c) , respectively. Using these notations, we first obtain an upper bound of U ⋆ CP,o . Using the fact that n ℓ workers have cost c and the rest of workers have cost 2c, it is straightforward to check
which implies p ≥ 2c is infeasible for budget B =
2 c < 2c · n. Therefore, (c, 0) is a feasible and an optimal CP policy when bonus must be zero. Furthermore, we obtain:
where the last inequality follows from the fact that n ℓ ≤ n 2 and the choice of utility function
We now obtain a lower bound of U ⋆ CP . To this end, consider a CP policy (0, c) without base payment. Since there is only bonus payment, workers only with profile (2, 2c) accept the task, i.e., n(0, c) = n h . A simple number theory implies n 4 ≤ n h ≤ n 4 + 1, and thus the CP policy (0, c) is feasible for budget B = n+4 2 c ≥ 2c · n h . Therefore, it follows that:
Combining (26) and (27) , the result holds.
Proof of Theorem 5.3
Since the optimal pricing in PP always dominates the pricing produced by CP-UNRES, the following holds for any worker profile r:
) by CP-UNRES. We now prove that, given an additional budget δ kB B, π g exactly achieves the utility of ModifiedGreedy. As mentioned in Section 3.1, recall that ModifiedGreedy recruits either the workers 1, 2, . . . , k B or the highest-quality worker. Using the hypothesis of U ⋆ PP (B) ≥ 2 · U (r • e (i) ), it is straightforward to see that the highest-quality worker is not selected, thus the workers 1, 2, . . . , k B are chosen by ModifiedGreedy.
We now compute the budget required for CP-UNRES to recruit the workers 1, 2, . . . , k B . Since the output of CP-UNRES has the form of (0, q g ), where q g must satisfy
, since it recruits the worker k B . Thus, the total expected payment of CP-UNRES is larger than or equal to
Using the fact that the workers are aligned in descending order of bang-per-buck, the following holds: 
Then, the total payment to workers turns out to be at most δ kB B in CP-UNRES when it recruits the same set of workers as ModifiedGreedy does with budget B. Hence, CP-UNRES with additional budget δ kB B achieves the approximation ratio of 1 2 , compared to the optimal PP policy with budget B, since ModifiedGreedy has the approximation ratio 1 2 . Thus, we get CP-UNRES has PoA of ( 1 2 , δ kB ).
In an additive utility function, the following holds for k B :
where (32) holds since optimal CP policy with budget δ kB leads to a larger utility than optimal PP policy with budget B, and (33) holds due to the fact that U (r
, as proved in Section 6.2. Thus, as in (32), we have:
Thus, CP-UNRES with budget δ kB B achieves the approximation ratio of 1 − 
Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we present simulation and real experimental results, which support our analytical findings and further provide some useful implications, in particular, on the qualification of workers.
Simulation
Setup. We consider the typo correction task mentioned in Section 2. The total number of typos is M = 25, and the number of workers is n = 15. We assume workers strategically decide whether or not to take the task as described in (2) . Each worker i is associated with cost c i and ability s i , where once she accepts the task, she corrects random number Y i of typos at constant cost c i , and each typo is detected and corrected independently with probability s i . Recalling each worker' quality is her normalized expectation of bonus, the ability s i can be translated into various qualities q i , depending on the employed bonus policy that estimates worker i's quality from Y i and decides the amount of bonus, while Y i depends on only ability s i (i.e., Y i is a binomial distribution with parameter s i ). We consider the following bonus policies, which provide a variety of different translation of ability to quality:
• m-threshold. This grants the bonus only if Y i ≥ m to each worker i. Hence the instant bonus is given
, and thus the ability s i is translated into quality q i as
• Linear. This grants the bonus proportional to Y i /M to each worker i. Thus, the instant bonus is given as q i · Y i /M , and thus the ability s i is translated into quality q i as q i = s i . As observed in our earlier analysis, e.g., Theorem 4.3, the optimal pricing depends on the worker profile, where a bonus policy defines the translation of ability to quality, and thus controls the worker profile. In this section, we numerically study the optimal pricing with a different choice of bonus policy, where we use an exhaustive search to obtain an optimal pricing for each setting. In our simulations, we generate cost c i and correction probability s i from some distribution 6 , and consider budget B = 4 and the utility function in (1), i.e., the expected number of typos, each of which is corrected by at least one worker.
Qualities under different bonus policies. We first investigate how the worker qualities change for different bonus polices, shown in Figure 2a , where for m-threshold bonus, we vary the value of m. First, we observe that the cost-quality curve of the linear bonus policy shows the distribution of cost c i and ability s i since ability s i is directly translated into quality r i . Here the quality almost linearly varies in a small range [0.7, 0.9] even if the cost varies in a wide range [0. 25, 0.8] . This can be interpreted as the fact that the worker profile generated by the linear policy is in effort-unresponsive regime, where worker qualities with different cost are not very differentiated. Similarly, m-threshold policy with small m = 15 has the effort-unresponsive worker profile. However, m-threshold with large m translates the small gap between worker abilities into a large gap between worker qualities. Hence, we numerically confirm that as m increases, quality becomes more sensitive to cost, and thus the worker profile with m = 19 and m = 23 changes to effort-subresponsive and effort-responsive, respectively. Such changes of the worker profiles imply the possibility of controlling worker quality by controlling the bonus policy.
Optimal CP in different regimes. We now study how optimal CP can be controlled manipulating the worker profile through bonus policy. First, in Figure 2b , we present workers who accept the task under the optimal CP with different bonus policies. With the linear policy and the m-threshold with small m ≤ 17, resulting in effort-unresponstive regime, the optimal CP targets only low-quality workers, which coincide with [ℓ, n]-picking in Theorem 4.3. Further, as m increases, the system becomes more of effort-responsive regime passing through effort-subresponsive regime, and thus the target of optimal CP move to mid-quality workers, i.e., Figure 2c , for different values of m in m-threshold bonus policy, we compute the optimal CP, showing that how the optimal base and bonus payments change for different cost-quality regimes. When m ≤ 17, i.e., effort-unresponsive regime, we observe that giving only the bonus payment is optimal. When m ≥ 17, the base payment becomes positive, where, in particular, for m ∈ [19, 22] , the ratio of base to bonus payments becomes non-negligible. However, for m = 25, which is back to effort-unresponsive regime, the base payment becomes again very low.
Power of bonus and price of agnosticity. In Figure 2d , we compare the utilities of optimal PP and CP with different bonus polices, and also optimal PP and CP without bonus, where the optimal PP and CP without bonus are obtained assuming worker abilities {s i } is given directly, since for any m, quality with m-threshold policy can be reversely translated into ability, i.e., the translation is invertible. We observe that, regardless of the choice of bonus policy, the optimal utility of PP achieves the same value, while the worker quality changes dramatically with respect to m as shown in Figure 1a . As studied in Theorem 3.1, this is because the bonus payment is not mandatory for PP, having the mighty controllability with only base payment. Indeed, the computed optimal PP with m-threshold bonus has zero bonus for all m. As stated in Theorem 5.3, the utility gap between PP and CP's is marginal. In fact, it is not hard to see that PoA (γ, 1) is very close to (1, 1). However, comparing CP without bonus to PP or CP with bonus, the utility decrease due to absence of bonus is significant. This implies that despite loss of controllability, only well-designed CP can fully exploit the benefit from using bonus payment. On the choice of bonus policy, we see that the utility of optimal CP with m-threshold is increasing before m = 20, decreasing after m = 21, and maximized at m = 20, although the variation is not large. When m is too small, even low-quality workers can get bonus easily, and thus the utility degenerates due to the waste of budget to low-quality workers. When m is too large, even high-quality workers think the qualification for bonus is too strict, which limits the number of recruited workers. Hence, this results suggests to define challenging but doable qualification for bonus 6 We sample {c i } i∈N from the beta distribution with α = β = 5, and map c i to s i using some reasonable logistic function of c i , where we use s i = 1/(1 + e −3c i ). 
Real-world Experiment
We conduct real experiments on a popular crowdsourcing platform, Amazon Mechnical Turk (Mturk). In Mturk, PP policy is infeasible, since the platform does not only provide incoming workers' profile in advance, but also it is discouraged to discriminate users via individual pricing. Hence, we focus on the real-world performance of only CP policy, which justifies our theoretical findings, and provides useful insight on designing a simple pricing in practice.
Experiment setup. In our experiments, we asked workers to proofread an article consisting of 318 words with 15 typos, which we randomly inserted from a list of common spelling errors. Workers were asked to provide the line number of each typo, the incorrect word, and the corrected word. We consider 8 CP policies, each of which differs in terms of bonus policy, and the amount of base/bonus payments (p, q). First, as bonus policies, we use m-threshold, and linear policies with m = 8 or 14 and (p, q) = ($0.1, $0.4) or ($0.1, $1.4), where with the goal of preventing workers from knowing threshold value m, which results in bias, we convert each m into its corresponding percentage, when posted, i.e., 50%-and 90%-thresholds instead of 8-and 14-thresholds. To study the impact of bonus, we use CP policies without bonus such that (p, q) = ($1, 0) or ($1.6, 0). To avoid bias in the experiment, we distribute the same task over 480 workers, where each of 8 CP policies is a subset of 60 workers, which are selected uniformly at random without overlapping. As a result, up to 32 hours after posting the task, 172 workers out of 480 took the task and reported 1, 616 typos. For each pricing policy, we present utility, total payment, and the number of participants over time in Figure 3 , where we extend the typo correction utility in (1), and define a redundant utility as the number of typos, each of which is corrected by at least 10 workers. We believe that compared to the typo correction utility without redundant counting, the redundant utility is more suitable and useful, since this redundancy eliminates the impact of outliers (i.e., the workers who correct every typo at low price) whose number is extremely small in our experiment.
Power of bonus. In Figures 3b and 3c , comparing to pricing ($0.1, $1.4) with 90%-threshold bonus, pricing ($1.6, 0) without bonus has poorer utility, while it spent 6.35 times more budget: $43.2. vs. $6.8. This clearly supports the power of bonus in Theorem 5.1. In Figure 3d , the number of participants under the pricing ($0.1, $1.4) with 90%-threshold bonus and the pricing ($1.6, 0) are simiarly many: 26 and 27, respectively. Hence, this implies that the utility loss of the pricing ($1.6, 0) can be interpreted as workers' sloppy participation, which might be caused by the fact that their performance would not be affected by what they earn from the task.
Choice of bonus policy. We now compare bonus policies. In overall, it can be seen that linear bonus does not work well, compared to 50%-threshold or 90%-threshold bonus. For example, compared to 90%-threshold with bonus $0.4, the linear policy with generous bonus $1.4 has a similar utility, even though it spends 5.7 times more budget. This can be explained as different minds of workers, given the linear and threshold policies. Under the linear policy, even if a worker walks away in the middle of the task, she would get some bonus for the effort made by that time. However, under the threshold-based policy, once she starts the task, she might try to finish it rather than to give up in the middle due to risk of getting no bonus. Further, it is interesting to compare the time to reach a certain level of utility. Comparing 50%-and 90%-threshold policies with the same bonus value $1.4, in Figure 3b , 50%-threshold reaches maximum utility 15 in much shorter time than 90%-threshold:4 and 14 hours after release. This suggests us a trade-off between relaxed (50%) and tight (90%) bonus policies which provide quicker response with more budget, and slower response with less budget, respectively.
Conclusion
Posted pricing is popular in practical crowdsourcing systems. In this paper, we analytically studied the impact of personalization and bonus payment in posted pricing. We first derived the optimal personalized and common pricing schemes and analyze their computational tractability, where optimal personalized posted pricing is proved to be NP-hard, but optimal common pricing is polynomial-time solvable under various regimes of cost-quality relations. We also studied how powerful bonus payment is in common pricing, where it was established that a simple idea of bonus in common pricing is able to control the behaviors of workers well, so as to properly recruit and discourage high-quality and low-quality workers, respectively. Our analytical findings, verified through simulations and real experiments, support many current crowdsourcing systems running with simple pricing policies and provide useful implications on how to intelligently employ workers via well-designed pricing policies.
